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Abstract 
 
In this work the efficiency of water markets in an irrigation district is put under 
consideration. This efficiency is referred to the private economic losses arising from a 
reduction of water availability, so the most efficient or optimal allocation rule will be the 
one that minimizes those losses or the one that provides the maximum private benefit. 
Although other rules could be compared with a water market, we focus on this optimal 
allocation and the proportional reduction as well. The fundamentals of these three practices 
are included. 
 
Both the proportional and the optimal rule have been applied to an irrigation community 
and a water market has been simulated, in order to compare to each other in terms of 
economic efficiency. This has been done solving the respective optimization problem. 
Results show that water markets will improve the suboptimal allocation made applying 
proportional reductions, even when transaction costs are high. They also show that the 
greater the water restrictions, the greater are the gains from trade. It can be inferred too 
that, as long as all determinants have been taken into account and transaction costs are low 
enough, the losses of income ensuing from any prescribed water reduction will be the 
lowest both by means of the optimal allocation as with the market. Anyhow results and 
conclusions are clearly dependent on the relations made between allocations and yields.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Regulation of water use may either be direct, through a system of pricing, quotas, or a 
combination of both; or indirect, with a water market that is more or less institutionally 
controlled. The possibilities vary depending on the physical characteristics, and the 
economic, cultural, political, legal and institutional characteristics of each particular case  
(Tsur, 2009). The widely differing ways of allocating and charging for irrigation water in 
the world (see, for example, Johansson et al., 2002, or Berbel et al., 2007) thus reflect this 
variability. The proportional system, the market system and the introduction of a uniform 
quota rule, developed under the theory of social choice, was compared by Goetz et al. 
(2005), concluding, with a view to economic efficiency, that the water market leads to 
better overall results, particularly in severe water shortage situations.  
 
Significant evidence on the benefits of market allocation is provided from empirical studies 
of water markets in the United States of America, Spain or Chile (see f.e. Lee and 
Jouravlev, 1998). A comparative study of water markets in the states of Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah demonstrated that: (i) these markets 
appear to be relatively efficient in allocating water among uses recognized as beneficial, 
with transfer patterns clearly indicating a movement from lower to higher-value uses; (ii) 
third party effects involving consumptive water users, i.e., return flow externalities, are 
generally reflected in market decisions and prices, but not so instream flow, water quality 
and other values that are not represented in water rights; and (iii) water markets typically 
deviate substantially from the competitive market model, and observed market prices may 
serve as only a rough approximation of the social value of additional water supplies (Saliba 
and Bush, 1987; Saliba, 1987; Saliba et al., 1987). In southern Spain several studies on 
hypothetical water markets in irrigation districts have been dealt with (see f.i. Arriaza et 
al., 2002; Calatrava and Garrido, 2005; or Albiac et al., 2006). A simulation model 
comparison of the market approach adopted in Alicante with those found elsewhere in 
Spain, where trading is not permitted, indicated that the market is the most efficient in 
terms of net increases in regional income. The differences are not great with moderate 
water shortages, but significant in conditions of severe shortage (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998). 
 
However, the establishment of a water market demands skills and attitudes from the public 
administration, judicial systems and water users, as well as investment in registration of 
rights, monitoring and measurement systems, and possibly in improving water distribution 
and transportation systems (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998). Efficient construction of any market 
requires the existence of the necessary conditions for trading to occur: (i) well-defined 
property rights; (ii) public information on the supply of and the demand for water rights; 
and, (iii) the physical and legal possibility for trading to take place (Curie, 1985). 
Assigning well-defined property rights is a basic question, not only with a view to ensuring 
that the water markets operate smoothly, but also to enable the increasingly frequent 
periods of drought to be efficiently managed (Lorenzo-Lacruz et al., 2013). Any given 
distribution of endowments (rights) will give rise to one set of market outcomes; but if 
rights are poorly defined, market processes cannot be relied upon to allocate water 
resources efficiently. Therefore government policies play a critical role in defining the 
institutional setting for market operation and provide the basis for market activity by 
defining, allocating and enforcing water rights (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998). 
 
A continuous trade in water rights generates prices that by coordinating dispersed 
information and preferences indicate the opportunity cost of water or its relative scarcity. 
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Price is an information-rich signal which summarizes all information available to market 
participants and motivates appropriate levels of individual action in response to changing 
demand and supply conditions, thus performing the crucial rationing function in allocating 
resources to different uses and users. Thus, transferable water rights create a system of 
economic incentives in which those who have the best knowledge about returns to water in 
their intended use -water users themselves- are encouraged to use that knowledge to 
allocate water to higher-value uses and hence maximize its economic value. The extent to 
which observed market prices accurately measure the scarcity value of water and 
encourage its efficient allocation, will depend upon the extent to which the characteristics 
of the market approximate those of the competitive paradigm (Cummings and Nercissiantz, 
1992). The costs involved in the transfer of property, or transaction costs, and the costs of 
transporting water, can significantly affect this capacity of any market to operate 
efficiently. Transaction costs prevent the equalization of marginal water values among 
different uses, users and locations. These price differentials between and among uses, users 
and locations represent unrealized gains from trade, and hence inefficient allocation.  
 
In constrast to water marketing, a priori, any water sharing or allocation could be achieved 
by imposing suitable quotas or by a combination of quotas and pricing. Allocation rules 
that take into account the differences in water productivity between the various crop 
exploitations have been dealt with in Alarcón et al. (2014a, 2014b), proving that the most 
efficient is the rule that promotes crop-specific reductions so as to minimize the sum of all 
farmers’ losses of income within an irrigation community. In fact, irrigation water 
allocation has been often been modeled with the aim of maximizing the overall economic 
benefits (Reca et al., 2001; Shangguan et al., 2002; Benli and Kodal, 2003; Letcher et al., 
2004; Ortega et al., 2004; Babel et al., 2005; or Jin et al., 2012). Optimal water allocation 
has also been studied implementing game theory techniques (Sechi et al., 2013), fuzzy 
programming approaches (Lu et al., 2009; Wang and Huang, 2012) and fuzzy cooperative 
games (Sadegh and Kerachian, 2011). Environmental release has even been considered to 
optimally allocate water in detrimental of irrigated agriculture, combining the drought cost 
on the environment and irrigation net profit in terms of water use (Grafton et al., 2010).  
There are also plenty of studies looking to maximize the added benefit through modeling a 
water market. Many of them suggest that market options are more economically efficient 
than the non-market ones, especially in shortage situations, although the gains from trade 
may be very different among irrigators (Arriaza et al., 2002. Martínez and Gómez -Limón, 
2004; Calatrava and Garrido, 2006; Pujol et al., 2006; Blanco-Gutiérrez et al., 2011). 
 
Although theoretically some goals for water allocation, such as predictability, equity and 
fairness, and the need to reflect collective, public or social values, might be better served 
by non-market institutions, the existence of these problems does not necessary call for a 
non-market alternative (Anderson, 1982). Morover, in cases of water restrictions the sole 
target of maximizing the aggregated production in an irrigation area may inflict very 
different losses of income between farmers (Smout and Gorantiwar, 2006; Gorantiwar and 
Smout, 2007; Alarcón et al., 2014a, 2014b). Market transactions are fair in the sense that 
water reallocation takes place through voluntary mutually beneficial trades with perceived 
advantages for all the parties involved; each party must be made better off or one would 
refrain from trading. Markets can guarantee fairness only, however, if no single market 
participant can affect market prices. In addition, unless conducted in an institutional 
framework which causes market participants to take into account third party impacts, 
markets generally cannot guarantee fairness to third parties who may be negatively 
affected by market transactions (Lee and Jouravlev, 1998). 
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In this paper we focus on a way to obtain the information requirements needed for water to 
be allocated efficiently. On the whole, information requirements for efficient water 
marketing are no greater than those needed for an effective administrative allocation of 
water (Easter, 1994). Besides it is shown herein that intra-sectoral water markets for 
irrigation can improve substantially the efficiency gained by other allocative mechanisms 
and approach the most profitable water allocation among the users within an irrigation 
district. This aproximation will be bigger the lower the transaction costs are, hence a 
comparisson is made. The optimal water allocation can also be attained through an 
institutional setting of water rights, as long as there is no informational constraints, making 
that the marginal benefit gained from every single plot of land within a district is the same. 
In this paper we study annalytically the way to do this when an irrigation water shortage is 
concerned. 
 
 
2. THEORETICAL SETTINGS AND METHODS 
 
2.1. Water benefit functions 
 
The cost to farmers resulting from the implementation of water restrictions can be easily 
deduced from their net private marginal benefit, MB, functions. Many examples of the 
estimation of the marginal value of water can be found in the literature (Young 2005; 
Mesa-Jurado et al. 2010; or Moriana et al. 2003). Constructing yield functions is possible 
from biophysical simulators of crop growth (e.g. Goetz et al. 2005). In practice, where 
literature does not provide yield functions, they may be estimated by using a specific 
software package, CropSyst or AquaCrop FAO crop-model for instance.  
 
In the absence of field data with which one could perform econometric analyses, we 
propose a less data-demanding method. In a particular irrigation zone, B represents the 
benefit which can be obtained from growing a particular crop. Thus, substracting the 
benefit that can be obtained without irrigation, Bs, gives us the increasing benefit that is 
obtained by applying a water allocation, q: IB(q) = B – Bs. Marginal Benefit, MB, is the 
benefit variation resulting from increasing q in a unit.  
 
Although other formulae could be used, for the purpose of simplicity, we will use quadratic 
benefit functions of the following type:  
qkqmBBqIB s ·2
)( 2 +⋅=−=
  
    |      0≥q ,  m < 0,  k > 0 (1) 
kqm
dq
dIB
dq
dBMB +⋅===  (2) 
From this simple setup, it is clear that it will be of interest to irrigate if MB>0, although its 
value decreases as the amount of water applied increases (because m<0).  
 
If irrigation water deliveries are reduced, the new allocation for each irrigator, q, will be 
less than or equal to a reference allocation, without restrictions, qr, which must be 
consistent with the crop requirements to obtain the maximum benefit, Br. In such a case, 
the benefit strictly derived from irrigation would be IBr = Br - Bs. Thus, the maximum point 
(qr, IBr) will be taken as the reference point. Note that the double point condition, 
mathematical maximum, means that the two coefficients m and k can be easily determined: 
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So using these reference values, qr and IBr, for a given water availability, q*=q/qr, 
equations (1) and (2) can be written: 
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The consequent loss of income derived from any water availability, q*<1, is obtained from:  
( )2*1 qIBIBIBBBL rrr −⋅=−=−=  (6) 
There may be crops with different types of benefit functions within one single irrigation 
district. Furthermore, there could well be other sectors that are competing with irrigation 
for their own water requirements, and such sectors might have very different benefit 
functions. In such cases, the power functions offer considerable versatility and could 
supplement the quadratic functions well (see Alarcón et al., 2014a). 
 
2.2. Water allocation optimization 
 
We may think of an irrigation district where several crops and/or varieties are grown; or 
even growing the same variety, different yields arise in response to irrigation, as a result of 
variation in farmers’ abilities, soils, radiation, slopes or any other significant technical or 
environmental factor. Hence, there could be as many benefit functions as resulting from 
the combination of crop-varieties and farmers.  
 
For any given crop i, the percentage reduction of water in a particular year, with respect to 
a reference year of maximum benefit, has been expressed as qi*=qi/qri. When referring to 
an irrigation community, we will use bold notes and capital letters. So the percentage 
reduction of water in a particular year, with respect to a year with no water shortage, will 
be written as Q* = Q/Qr.  
 
The rule of proportional water reductions implies that the same percentage reduction of 
water availability is imposed to the irrigation community as a whole, and so to every crop 
and hectare: qi* = qi/qri = Q* = Q/Qr. Taking this into account, when using quadratic 
benefit functions, the loss of income of any of the i crops will be given by this expression:  
( ) ( )2*2* 11 Q−⋅=−⋅=−= riiriirii IBqIBIBIBL  (7) 
This rule hardly ever bring about the most efficient water allocation. In fact, it will do so 
only under the unlikely scenario when all growers share the same benefit function and the 
same initial allocation leads to an equal loss of income per hectare for all of them.  
 
However, the optimal allocation is such that the total income loss, L, is minimized or that 
the aggregate benefit for the community is maximized. The solution is obtained finding qi* 
that makes L minimum, with the limitation that the sum of the individual quotas allocated 
do not exceed the total amount of water available, Q. 
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In the optimal solution, the marginal benefit is the same for all those who receive an 
allocation. Thus, with quadratic benefit functions the following allocation would be 
obtained from: 
( ) MB=−⋅⋅= *12 i
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For the resulting value of MB, as all the allocations have to be greater than or equal to zero 
(qi≥0 → qi*≥0), the crops not meeting the condition that MB>riri qIB·2  will not be 
considered for receiving a water allocation. Consequently, each value of MB will 
correspond to an availability Q, which can be determined adding up the assigned values: 
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Once the value of MB has been estimated, expression (9) permits calculating the value of 
Q. Solving the opposite way, that is, knowing Q, and then determining MB must be done 
iteratively. Once MB is finally known from (9), the crop-specific allocation, qi*, can be 
found with expression (8). The optimum solution is independent of the initial situation: the 
lowest loss is reached through this optimal rule, regardless of whether or not the initial 
allocation is the reference situation. If users have other types of benefit functions, other 
formulation has to be considered so as to make the marginal costs equal for obtaining the 
optimum yields. 
 
2.3. Water markets  
 
Formulation of a water market 
 
When dealing with intra-sectoral water markets for irrigation, the object function to be 
maximized is the irrigators' added benefit in an irrigation community, IBm. The benefit of 
the farmers who sell water comes not only from the use of their allocations but also from 
the exchanges made, at a market price, Pm, for every m3 of water which is sold. If the 
opposite is the case, the buyers must pay for the new rights that they get, which are bought 
at the same price: 
)(·)(IB
1 0
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n
i
q
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 (10) 
where qpi is every water allocation resulting from the application of the proportional 
reduction rule: qpi = qi* · qri ; refering it to the irrigation community as a whole, qpi = 
Q*·Qr. qmi stands for each final allocation reached through the market, once the 
corresponding water rights have been completely traded. Obviously, when qpi > qmi, 
irrigator i will be a seller; otherwise he/she would be a buyer, except for the case when no 
business is made (qpi = qmi). 
 
IBm will be related to the MB crop-specific functions and the water availability after the 
reduction, Q*·Qr. This quantity should be the same as the one reached through the 
proportional rule and lower than the reference allocation of the irrigation community. Thus 
we have the first input constraint: ∑ ∑
= =
==
n
i
n
i
ipim
qq
1 1
r
*
·QQ . The same way, water 
allocations must not be bigger than the reference ones with no water shortage: qmi < qri. 
Another constraint in this problem is that every allocation is not negative: qmi > 0. 
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Besides, the amounts of water bought and sold ought to be just the same and equal to the 
total amount of water exchanged in a market where there are k buyers (superindex b) and 
n-k water sellers (superindex s): i
n
ki
mi
s
pi
s
k
i
ipi
b
mi
b AqqAqq ·)()·(
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∑∑
+==
−=− , where Ai stands 
for the area dedicated to each crop. 
 
Finally, an output constraint has been considered, by means of which each irrigator’s 
benefit reached through the market must be higher than the one attained through the 
proportional rule: IBmi > IBpi. In doing so, the optimization problem leads to a solution 
where an implicit condition is fulfilled for both buyers and sellers: MBi=ct. Therefore the 
same final solution than the one from the optimal rule should be attained. 
 
Water markets conditions 
 
For a market to ensure flexibility in the allocation of existing water supplies, it is necessary 
only that within any individual market there is a tradeable margin subject to low-cost 
reallocation (Howe et al., 1986). This necessary condition is shown in the following Figure 
1. It features the marginal benefit functions, MB, of two crops, two plots of land, two farms 
or two irrigators. After applying the optimal allocation, an allocation qr1 is assigned to the 
first irrigator’s crop, while a lower qr2 is assigned to the second irrigator’s crop. So, being 
crop 1 more productive than crop 2, the irrigator 1 can be interested in acquiring water 
rights from irrigator 2; and this one in selling them to the first. 
 
In Figure 1 we see that for a certain volume of water exchangeable, x, the irrigator 1 has 
more to gain than lose the irrigator 2 because, comparing the dotted areas in this figure, 
qr1BEqm1 > qr2DFqm2. Therefore, there is room for negotiation including an amount equal 
to the difference between the two areas. The irrigator 2 will sell part of its endowment, x = 
qr2 – qm2, for an amount of money that could improve the situation of not selling, i.e., 
he/she will sell it to a high enough price to offset the loss of income that involves watering 
less and still make a profit. Similarly, the irrigator 1 will buy rights to a cheap enough price 
so as the benefit to be achieved with an extra volume, x = qm1 – qr1, allowes him to make 
money. The equilibrium point will be in the price, Pe, for which both irrigators earn exactly 
the same. This extra gain or benefit is represented by the two darkest areas in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical conditions for the exchange of water rights (x), for a buyer (1) and a seller 
(2), after a water restriction has been imposed i → r 
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Unless transactions were made directly among irrigators, an organization that would enable 
them to contact and operate is demanded, a market ultimately. Some resources are needed 
to establish, operate, and enforce a market system which should be paid by the 
stakeholders. This imply the so called transaction costs, Ct. To make it simpler, we may 
include in them the transportation and infrastructure costs. Transaction costs may be in 
whole or in part transferred back to trading parties through fees and taxes levied on water 
rights transfers. In such a way, the price of sale or final market price, would not be Pe, but 
greater, to include them: Pm = Pe + Ct. In spite of this, some components of Ct can be 
independent of the quantity transferred: the title search, filing fees, and other similar costs 
often do not vary significantly with the quantity of water being transferred. In terms of 
equity, transaction costs should be shared equally between the buyer and the seller, in such 
a way that each should pay the organization a Ct/2 amount for the transaction made.  
 
Depending on the negotiation margin and the transaction costs, exchange will prove 
attractive or unattractive to the farmers. Ultimately, the market will not take place should 
the marginal values for water, net of transaction and conveyance costs, be equated across 
water users, uses, and locations. The equalization occurs because the market provides both 
an incentive and a means for water users to reallocate water rights to higher-value uses 
whenever reallocation would generate positive net benefits. Thus, if we start with a sub-
optimal allocation of water, the introduction of a market would achieve an efficiency 
nearly optimal. But if, on the contrary, the starting point is the optimal allocation, for 
which the marginal benefits of each and every one of the irrigators are equal, there will be 
no room for negotiation, and no market, regardless of the transaction costs that apply, will 
be able to improve this efficiency.  
 
The latter can be seen in Figure 2 below. Starting from a water sharing for which MBr1 = 
MBr2, neither the irrigator 1 nor the irrigator 2 are interested in buying or selling water, 
because in doing so, they would incur losses. Thus, if irrigator 1 decides to acquire rights, 
he/she would have to do it at a lower price than MBr1; but at this price, the irrigator 2 
would not be interested in selling. Conversely, if the irrigator 2 sells at a higher price than 
MBr2, the irrigator 1 would not buy, because he/she would pay more than what he/she gets 
for having more water. In the extreme case where the market price is equal to the marginal 
benefit, for an amount of water exchanged, x, these two irrigators would face the losses 
that appear in Figure 2 with a darker shading. 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical conditions of market saturation, for which the exchange of water rights (x) 
does not benefit the buyer (1) neither the seller (2) 
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3. CASE STUDY 
 
The previous theoretical analysis has been tested in the irrigation community No. V of 
Riegos de Bardenas, located in the provinces of Zaragoza and Navarra (Northeast of 
Spain). Because of its large area (15895 ha) and variety of crops, which are allocated 
different volumes, it provides an insightful illustration of our analysis. Moreover, this 
district offers sufficient data to implement the analytical procedure. In the annual reports of 
this community (CRVRB 2011, 2012 and 2013), crop patterns and water consumption 
referred to recent years are reported. The community report indicated that, in response to 
lower wholesale district availability, a reduction of 7.29% in the stated average quota was 
expected from 2011 to 2012.  
 
A baseline scenario was defined by the crop pattern in year 2011, as well as by the 
allocations under no water restrictions (table 1). These reference allocations were chosen 
as the largest ones in the series 2006-2012. With them, maximum benefit is supposed to be 
achieved. Accordingly, it can be said that the water consumption in 2011 was 5.23% lower 
than it should have been in the reference situation to meet all water demands. For every 
crop, data to estimate net margin were taken from official statistics (Gobierno de Aragón, 
2012) and some technical reports. 
 
Table 1. Baseline scenario in Riegos de Bardenas no. V community 
Crop pattern in 2011 
Area (A) 
Reference 
allocation  
(qr) 
Reference 
irrigation benefit 
(IBr) 
Reference  
rainfed benefit 
(Bs) Land uses 
ha % m3 ha-1 yr-1 €2011 ha-1 €2011 ha-1 
Alfalfa 2 991 18.82 12 271 823.94 83.35 
Corn 3 741 23.54 9 477 213.95 26.42 
Cereals 4 905 30.86 3 884 112.55 68.80 
Grassland 1 725 10.85 10 689 696.71 430.77 
Rice 689 4.33 9 312 776.09 -269.47 
Vegetables 487 3.06 10 620 2 222.38 -123.72 
Sunflower 221 1.39 6 552 34.16 2.35 
Leguminous 342 2.15 2 524 660.37 385.17 
Wooded land 171 1.08 2 935 0.00 0.00 
Vineyard 29 0.18 736 527.86 1 027.81 
Set aside 594 3.74 0 0.00 0.00 
Totals  15 895 100.00 124.07·106 6.884.409 1 344 815 
  Source: Alarcón et al. (2014b). 
 
Quadratic benefit functions were obtained using the method described in section 2.1. Then 
the proportional rule and the optimal allocation considered in the theoretical sections were 
applied to the baseline scenario. Afterwards, taking as starting point the water sharing 
obtained from the former, an internal water market was simulated. In doing so, areas were 
kept unchanged, included the land set aside. Woody crops were regarded as a social use, 
and for this reason an exception to the rules: allocations were not changed for them, even if 
no monetary gains accrued from this policy. The expected 7.29% reduction in the average 
quota of year 2011 was set for the three allocation mechanisms, except for woody crops. In 
terms of reference allocations, this means a reduction up to 12% (Q* = 88%). Besides, with 
the aim of testing the effects of the severity in water shortage, a much higher restriction has 
been dealt with: 25% in the water availability of 2011 (Q* = 0.71). 
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4. RESULTS  
 
The solutions of the corresponding optimization problems for the water restrictions of 
7.29% (Q* = 0.88) and 25% (Q* = 0.71) in the water availability of 2011 were obtained 
using the Solver tool in the MsExcel package. Otherwise they could also be obtained with 
a modeling system for mathematical programming problems such as General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS). The analytical models in Section 2 provide the same results, 
which have been performed in an Excel spreadsheet using the iterative calculation option 
and assuming initial values which are automatically corrected by simple procedures.  
 
In the case of the market, the benefit maximization problem has been solved by trying 
several prices for water exchanged. According to what it has been said in the theoretical 
sections, after applying the proportional reduction, the greater benefits are achieved at a 
water price, Pm, corresponding to the average value between the highest marginal benefit, 
MB, of the crop group for which rights are transferred, and the lowest MB of the crops for 
which rights are acquired: Pm = € 0.0115 m-3 (Q* = 0.88); € 0.0273 m-3 (Q* = 71). These 
prices are slightly lower than the MB of the entire community, averaged over all crops’ 
consumption, and slightly higher than the median. This is depicted in Figure 3 below, 
intended for the reduction of 7.29% in the water availability of 2011 (Q* = 0.88). 
 
Figure 3. Differentiation between crops for which water rights could be either perceived or 
transferred according to the distribution function of marginal benefit (MB), after a reduction of 
7.29% in the water of 2011 (Q*=0.88) in Riegos de Bardenas no. V community 
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Figure 4 shows water allocations both when no water restriction is considered, that is, the 
reference allocations (Q* = 1), and under the severe restriction corresponding to Q* = 0.71. 
For the latter, allocations have been worked out from applying either the corresponding 
proportional reduction or a market with no transaction costs, equivalent to the optimal 
reallocation. The respective irrigation benefits per hectare, IB, are also represented. 
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Figure 4. Water allocations, q, and irrigation benefits, IB, under no restrictions and by applying 
the proportional rule and a market with no transaction costs in Riegos de Bardenas no.V, 
targeting the same reduction of 25% in the water of 2011 (Q*=0.71) 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
q 
(m
3 
ha
-
1 )
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
IB
 
(€ 
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-
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Reference allocation (q) 12,271 9,477 3,884 10,689 9,312 10,620 6,552 2,524 736
q for Proportional reduction 8,720 6,734 2,760 7,595 6,617 7,546 4,656 1,794 523
q for Market Ct=0 - Optimal realloc. 10,288 4,922 2,430 8,909 8,100 10,069 0 2,419 724
Reference irrigation benefit (IB) 824 214 113 697 776 2,222 34 660 528
IB for Proportional reduction 755 196 103 638 711 2036 31 605 484
IB for Market Ct=0 - Optim. realloc. 760 214 106 642 723 2148 127 642 522
Alfalfa Corn Cereals Grassland Rice Vegetables Sunflower Legumin. Vineyard
 
 
The following table 2 shows the average allocations as well as the average and 
accumulated benefits for the whole irrigation community, under no shortage (reference 
situation) and when both reductions of 7.29% and 25% in the water of year 2011 is 
introduced, either by applying the proportional reduction or a market with zero transaction 
costs. This best market solution where Ct = 0, coincides with the optimal allocation. A 
more significant difference in the irrigation benefit, IB, arising from one or the other rules 
is obtained under the most severe shortage.  
 
Table 2. Average allocations and average and accumulated benefits in Riegos de Bardenas no.V, 
under no water restrictions and reductions of 7.29% and 25% in the water of 2011 (Q*=0.88 and 
Q*=0.71), either by applying proportional reduction or a market with no transaction costs 
Scenarios 
Average allocations 
(m3 ha-1) 
Average irrigation 
benefit (€ ha-1) 
Accumulated 
irrigation benefit (€) 
No water restrictions Q* = 1 7 738 455 6 884 409 
Reduction for Q* = 0.88:    
    Proportional reduction 6 860 448 6 782 554 
    Market Ct = 0 - Optimal reallocation 6 860 451 6 818 743 
Reduction for Q* = 0.71:    
    Proportional reduction 5 803 417 6 307 756 
    Market Ct = 0 - Optimal reallocation 5 803 430 6 504 525 
 
For this hypothetical market in which there are no transaction costs, the loss of income 
with respect to the year 2011 as well as the economic efficiency relative to the proportional 
reduction and the optimal allocation are shown in the third column of the next table 3. In a 
market like this, perfectly competitive, it would apply the so-called equilibrium price, with 
zero transaction costs (Pm = Pe). In the following columns of table 3, the values resulting 
under several transaction costs, Ct, are expressed as percentages of the equilibrium price. 
As it can be seen, even with very high Ct values, the market would still be more efficient 
than the proportional rule. The gains from trade under every Ct considered have been 
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calculated substracting the consequent irrigation benefit from reduced water availability to 
the irrigation benefit reached through a market with no tansaction costs (36187 €; 196769 
€). These gains are shown in the last row of table 3. 
 
Table 3. Gains from trade and market efficiency under different transaction costs, Ct, with respect 
to the proportional reduction and the optimal reallocation, in Riegos de Bardenas no.V, targeting 
reductions of 7.29% and 25% in the water of 2011 (Q*=0.88 and Q*=0.71)  
Transaction costs 
Market attributes 
%Pe 0 5 10 15 20 25 
Ct (€ m-3) 0 0.0006 0.0011 0.0017 0.0023 0.0029 
Reduction for Q* = 0.88 
Pm (€ m-3) 0.0115 0.0120 0.0126 0.0132 0,0137 0,0143 
Water exchanged hm3 4.21 4.21 3.86 3.57 3.10 1.27 
Loss of income relative to the benefits of 2011 % 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.15 
Efficiency relative to the proportional reduction % 100.53 100.52 100.52 100.52 100.50 100.33 
Efficiency relative to the optimal reallocation % 100.00 100.00 99.99 99.99 99.97 99.80 
Gains from trade € 36 187 35 978 35 565 35 278 34 182 22 567 
Ct (€ m-3) 0 0.0014 0.0027 0.0041 0.0055 0.0068 
Reduction for Q* = 0.71 
Pm (€ m-3) 0.0273 0.0286 0.0300 0.0313 0.0327 0.0341 
Water exchanged hm3 9.43 9.43 9.37 8.44 7.36 6.24 
Loss of income relative to the benefits of 2011 % 5.52 5.52 5.52 5.54 5.63 5.78 
Efficiency relative to the proportional reduction % 103.12 103.12 103.12 103.09 103.00 102.84 
Efficiency relative to the optimal reallocation % 100.00 100.00 100.00 99.97 99.81 99.73 
Gains from trade € 196 769 196 769 196 745 194 955 189 040 178 930 
 
As it can be observed, the results are sensitive not only to the transaction costs, but also to 
the reduction in water. Market efficiency with respect to the proportional rule increases 
accordingly to the severity of the shortage, and much more the gains from trade. In the 
worst case, where Ct are equivalent to 25% of Pe, the market would still be more efficient 
than the proportional rule and would reach almost the efficiency of the optimal allocation. 
 
According to Colby et al. (1989), in the states of Colorado, New Mexico and Utah, 
transaction costs incurred by applicants to satisfy state regulation averaged 6% of the 
prices paid for water rights. In Chile, transaction costs are particularly low in the areas with 
modern infrastructure and well-developed water users associations: total transaction and 
transportation were fixed around 2 and 5% of market price; and transaction costs meant 
around 10% of gross gains from intra-agricultural trades (Hearne and Easter, 1995). As it 
can be seen in table 4, in our study case transaction costs of 5% of the market price, Pm (in 
second column), would approximately lead to a loss of only 0.6% of the gross gains, Gm, 
when Q* = 0.88, and 0% when Q* = 0.71. For Q* = 0.88, 10% of Gm would be lost in 
response to transaction costs of around 17% of Pm; while for Q* = 0.71, Ct higher than 20% 
of Pm will be needed. Therefore, in a rough comparisson with those water markets in Chile, 
this one in Riegos de Bardenas no.V community could be seen as quite competitive.  
 
Table 4. Transaction costs, Ct, totals and per m3 of the water exchanged, expressed as percentages of 
the equilibrium price, Pe, the market price, Pm, and the gains from trade, Gm, in Riegos de Bardenas 
no.V with a 7.29% and 25% reduction in the water of 2011 (Q* = 0.88 and 0.71) 
Ct (€) Ct  (€ m-3) Ct (%Gm) 
Ct (%Pe) Ct (%Pm) 
Q* = 0.88 Q* = 0.71 Q* = 0.88 Q* = 0.71 Q* = 0.88 Q* = 0.71 
0 0 .00 0 0 0 .00000 0 .00000 0 .00 0 .00 
5 4 .76 209 0 0 .00005 0 .00000 0 .58 0 .00 
10 9 .09 622 23 0 .00016 0 .00001 1 .72 0 .01 
15 13 .04 910 1.814 0 .00025 0 .00051 2 .51 0 .92 
20 16 .67 2.006 7.728 0 .00065 0 .00250 5 .54 3 .93 
25 20 .00 13.621 17.838 0 .01071 0 .01403 37 .64 9 .07 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
As it has been showed, the simulated market achieves the efficiency of the optimal 
allocation rule, as long as the transaction costs are null. This result was likely expected, 
owing to that a mathematical problem as the one formulated for the optimal allocation, if 
well made, has a unique solution and, therefore, this solution cannot economically be 
improved without changing the problem. Therefore, the implementation of optimal 
allocation would leave no room for improvement on the market, unless reality provides 
certain nuances that were not adequately reflected in the formulated problem. Among these 
aspects not included in the formulation of this optimization problem, perhaps the most 
influential would be the crop calendars and the seasonality of rainfall. 
 
The results obtained clearly depend on the reference values which are taken for the 
endowments, qr, and the benefits from water, IBr. These values hardly ever will be the 
same within the same irrigation area, as already noted. When real data provided by the 
irrigation community are lacked, an approach to the problem of variability in the reference 
values could be differentiate production rates by crop, as it is made in the Cadastre, but this 
solution would only involve IBr values. A sensitivity analysis in determining the allocation 
of the water applied to the same irrigation district dealt in this paper, under conditions of 
uncertainty, has been addressed in Alarcón et al. (2014b). Specifically, two standard 
distributions for each crop were devised, with qr and IBr as their means, and two respective 
coefficients of variation: CVqr = 0.15 and CVIBr = 0.30. With both CV, three qr and three 
IBr values were set, namely [qr·(1-CVqr), qr, qr·(1+CVqr)] for qr and [IBr·(1-CVIBr), IBr , 
IBr·(1+CVIBr)] for IBr. Their combination makes nine types for every crop. The area 
allocated to each crop type was set accordingly to the corresponding probabilities of the 
bivariate standard normal distribution: 0.204 for (qr, IBr), 0.075 for (qr·(1±CVqr), 
IBr·(1±CVIBr)), 0.124 for (qr·(1±CVqr), IBr) and (qr, IBr·(1±CVIBr)). As it is remarked in 
Alarcón et al. (2014b), with greater CVqr and CVIBr, the best results are obtained, in a sense 
that the total community losses diminish. As a consequence, searching for more precise 
data is highly recommended.  
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
It has been shown that the optimal reallocation and the market can correct the 
inefficiencies of an initial water allocation. In a setting with many buyers and sellers, full 
information, zero transaction costs, no bargaining and other stringent assumptions, the final 
allocation of water rights will be the same for the optimal reallocation and the market 
regardless of their initial distribution. On this view, the initial allocation does not make any 
difference, but matters to the quantity of transactions or reallocations, the equilibrium 
allocation of rights, and the aggregate benefits attained with both mechanisms. Since the 
allocation of water rights may be considered efficient, then close to the optimum, volumes 
of water that can be expected to be reallocated in response to shortages or changes in the 
value of its marginal productivity are generally not large.  
 
Both the optimal rule and the market are to be much more efficient than the proportional 
reduction rule, which in spite of it is being commonly used in collective irrigation 
organizations. Losses accruing from the application of one mechanism or another may be 
more or less important, depending on the characteristics of the irrigation community and 
the severity of the water shortage. Larger efficiency differences between them occur when 
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differences on technical, economic and environmental factors are taken into account. Only 
in situations with all users being identical, with large water allocations priced at reduced 
tariffs, will the proportional rule be quite economically efficient. However, under moderate 
or severe shortages and/or high water rates, other allocation schemes established under the 
criterion of economic efficiency ought to be encouraged with a view to balance the 
different interests of farmers. 
 
The optimal allocation rule allows to achieve a specified reduction in water allocation at a 
minimum overall cost. Its efficiency levels could be such so that there may be no market 
mechanism that improves it. Besides, the optimal allocation does not involve negotiation 
costs, and economies of scale could potentially reduce administrative costs in large 
centralized systems. However perfect knowledge of water allocations and irrigation 
benefits are demanded, because, as long as there is asymmetric information or uncertainty 
regarding these values, the optimum would not be attained. Within an irrigation district as 
large as the one studied, surely there would be important differences in the endowments 
applied and the benefits obtained of each crop. This expected heterogeneity would imply to 
consider a greater number of uses and marginal benefits than the ones considered herein. If 
public authorities had the necessary information to characterize all uses according to 
reality, they would have the chance to apply the optimal allocation. The difficulties in 
terms of accurately measuring the crucial variables and functions bring out the point of 
finding ways to deal with uncertainty, which would likely provide a more fruitful pathway 
to managing water resources.  
 
Conversely, the market generates some of the necessary information. This an important 
adventage when such information cannot be acquired at a reasonable cost, when it is 
fragmented and dispersed among all actual and potential water users, and when demand 
and supply conditions as well as the value of water are changeable. Another good point in 
water markets is that the heterogeneity in water uses boosts the participation of market 
stakeholders and the greater number of transactions will be carried out, thus improving the 
market efficiency.  
 
The case study has shown that, with low transaction costs, up to 10%, almost the maximum 
efficiency is reached and that even higher Ct do not detract much. Nevertheless the optimal 
allocation is preferable when Ct are sufficiently high. It has also been shown that 
transaction costs of about 5% of the equilibrium price make possible to obtain almost the 
same efficiencies that null Ct. This fact is interesting, as it provides a useful margin to 
finance the organization of water markets. By other hand, an increasing water scarcity 
raises gains from trade relative to the transaction costs. So water markets will become 
more active where and when water is sufficiently scarce, and hence valuable, since market 
transactions are precipitated by the difference in the value of water which must be large 
enough to outweigh the costs of obtaining water through the market process. 
 
Since the future prices in water transfers and the equilibrium allocation are unknown when 
a decision is made to introduce water rights transferability, the distributional implications 
cannot be known beforehand. On the whole, there is no particular reason to expect that a 
water market or even the optimal rule, although providing the greatest economic 
efficiency, will necessarily result in an equitable allocation of water resources or change 
income distribution in any particular way. To the extent that water transfers are associated 
with significant externalities, it is necessary to ensure that market prices will not deviate 
from the true opportunity cost of water and that the water rights must not come at the 
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expense of society as a whole. Economic efficiency requires that all costs and benefits 
associated with use and transfer decisions be accounted for. If not, a transfer may be 
beneficial to the trading parties, but actually inefficient from an overall social perspective.  
 
As long as equity and other important collective, public or social values related to water 
use are an important part of water policies, it may be necessary to opt for some 
governmental regulation, in a way that social and enviornmental restrictions can be added 
to the the optimal allocation rule and the market in order to limit externalities. From the 
viewpoint of economic efficiency, water rights holders must face the full opportunity costs 
of their actions, so external effects should be accounted for in transfer decisions. These 
concerns can usually be accommodated within the logic of the water allocation or market 
system, for example, by acquiring water rights for a desired purpose, levying taxes on 
those uses creating negative externalities or paying subsidies to those creating positive 
externalities. Therefore reliable hydrological information and a knowledge good enough of 
these externalities are essential to determine who would be affected by a transfer and the 
magnitude of injury. 
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